(In)Security of Embedded Devices' Firmware: Fast and Furious at Large Scale

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whoami

• Embedded security researcher, fresh Dr. :)













Hacking MERc


Hacking MFPs + PostScript




Embedded Devices Are Everywhere



by Wilgengebroed on Flickr [CC-BY-2.0]



Embedded Devices Smarter and More Complex



CONNECT

by Wilgengebroed on Flickr [CC-BY-2.0]

Embedded Devices More Interconnected



Embedded Software Firmware is Everywhere

• Embedded devices are diverse – but all of them run software, commonly referred to as firmware



Observations Magnitude of Embedded/Firmware

• By 2014, there were hundred thousands firmware packages (Costin et al., USENIX Security 2014)

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- By 2014, there were 14 billion Internet connected objects (Cisco, Internet of Things Connections Counter, 2014)
- By 2020, there will be between 20 and 50 billion interconnected IoT/embedded devices (*Cisco, The Internet of Everything in Motion, 2013*)


Importance of Embedded Systems' Security

- Embedded devices are ubiquitous

 Even invisible, they are essential to our lives
- Can operate for many years

 Legacy systems, no (security) updates
- Have a large attack surface
 - Web interfaces
 - Networking services
 - Debug interfaces (forgotten, backdoor)

Routers



- Routers
- Printers

Networked printers at risk (30/12/2011, McAfee Labs)



- Routers
- Printers
- VoIP

Cisco VoIP Phones Affected By On Hook Security Vulnerability (12/06/2012, Forbes)



- Routers
- Printers
- VoIP
- Cars

Hackers Reveal Nasty New Car Attacks – With Me Behind The Wheel (12/08/2013, Forbes)



- Routers
- Printers
- VoIP
- Cars
- Drones


Hacker Releases Software to Hijack Commercial Drones

by BRYANT JORDAN on DECEMBER 9, 2013

Like 489 people like this. Be the first of your friends.




- Routers
- Printers
- VoIP
- Cars
- Drones
- Fireworks



Firing Module

Remote Control




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- Routers
- Printers
- VoIP
- Cars
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- Fireworks
- Etc.




- Routers
- Printers
- VoIP
- Cars
- Drones
- Fireworks
- Etc.

Each of the above is a result of individual analysis Manual and tedious efforts \rightarrow Does not scale








IHEX format

:10000000C942A000C9434000C9434000C943400AA :100010000C9434000C9434000C9434000C94340090 :100020000C9434000C9434000C9434000C94340080 :100030000C9434000C9434000C9434000C94340070 :100040000C9434000C9434000C9434000C94340060 :100050000C94340011241FBECFE5D8E0DEBFCDBF25 :100060000E9436000C9445000C9400008FEF87BB73 :100070002CE231E088B3809588BB80E197E2F901FA :0E0080003197F1F70197D9F7F5CFF894FFCF3C :0000001FF


plain text firmware



Motorola m68k-based CPU



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
known/obvious vulns?

UART "boot>" prompts








802.15.4 functions




known/obvious vulns?









Goals and Challenges

$Idea \rightarrow Goal$

Perform large scale automated analysis to better understand, classify and analyze firmware images, without using devices



Challenges

- Large number of devices
- Large number of firmware files
- Highly heterogeneous systems
- Increasingly "smart", "connected"
- Highly unstructured firmware data
- Vulnerable devices exposed

Challenges → Solutions

- Large number of devices → Analysis without devices
- Large number of firmware files → Scalable architectures
- Highly heterogeneous systems → Generic techniques
- Increasingly "smart", "connected" → Focus on web interfaces & APIs
- Highly unstructured firmware data → Large dataset classification
- Vulnerable devices exposed → Technologyindependent device fingerprinting

Large Scale Challenge 1: Firmware and Device Classification


Firmware Classification Why and How?

- Why?
 - There are hundred thousands firmware packages (Costin et al., USENIX Security 2014)
 - Any volunteer for manual triage? :)
- How?
 - Machine Learning (ML)
 - E.g., python's scikit-learn

Firmware Classification ML Details

- Random Forests, Decision Trees
- File size
- Entropy value
- Extended entropy information
- Category strings
- Category unique strings


Firmware Classification ML Examples





Firmware Classification ML Summary


- The local optimum for our setup
 - Features [size, entropy, entropy extended, category strings, category unique strings]
 - Random Forests classifier
 - Training sets based on 40% of each category
 - Achieves more than 90% accuracy

Large Scale Challenge 2: Automated Static Analysis













Static Firmware Analysis Types of Tests


- Misconfiguration
 - Web-server configs, Code repositories
- Credentials
 - Weak/Default/Hard-coded
- Data enrichment
 - Versions \rightarrow Software packages
 - Keywords \rightarrow Known problems (telnet, shell, UART, backdoor)
- Correlation and clustering
 - Based on: Fuzzy hashes, Private SSL keys, Credentials













































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Static Firmware Analysis Some Results


38 new vulnerabilities


693 firmware images with at least one vulnerability

 140K online devices correlated to some vulnerabilities


Large Scale Challenge 3: Automated Dynamic Analysis


Unpacked Firmware Sources








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



































Ubuntu 14 VM


Linux X86_64 Kernel


Ubuntu 14 VM	QEMU (Debian Squeeze armel)
	Debian Squeeze armel Linux 2.6 Kernel
	Linux X86_64 Kernel

Ubuntu 14 VM	QEMU (Debian Squeeze armel)
	Pepian Squeeze Usersbace)
	Debian Squeeze armel Linux 2.6 Kernel
	Linux X86_64 Kernel









Dynamic Firmware Analysis Some Results


- High-severity vulnerability impact
 - Command injection, XSS, CSRF
 - Automated+scalable static and dynamic analysis
 - 225 high-severity vulnerabilities, many previously unknown
 - 185 firmware images (~10% of original)
 - 13 vendors (~25% of original)
- Total alerts from the tools
 - 6068 dynamic analysis alerts on 58 firmware images
 - 9046 static analysis alerts on 145 firmware images
 - Manual triage and confirmation is challenging

Applications

Application Example Industry Players

- 1 big player in SCADA/ICS/embedded
 - In "Top 100" of "Fortune Global 500" (2015)
- 3 years R&D contract (from 2015)
- Using our frameworks
 - For their own firmware life-cycle
 - Firmware collection, unpacking, analysis
 - Dynamic analysis and symbolic execution

Firmware.RE First project of its kind




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Firmware.RE Demo Time!



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Conclusions

- Plenty of latent vulnerabilities in embedded firmware
- Firmware security analysis is absolutely necessary
- Involves many untrivial steps and challenges
- A broader view on firmwares is not just beneficial, but necessary

Conclusions

- Security
 - Tradeoff with both cost and time-to-market
 - Clearly not a priority for some vendors
- Vendors are encouraged to:
 - Integrate this or similar frameworks in their firmware SoftDev and QA cycles
 - Have an easy to reach security@vendor.com security response team

Summary

- We build-up research expertise and implement our expertise in working prototypes
- First framework for automated large scale security analysis and classification of firmwares and embedded devices
 - Simple and advanced analysis using dynamic and static techniques
 - Quick identification of (un)known vulnerabilities
 - Automated classification and fingerprinting

References

- Please read, share, RT!
 - "Automated Dynamic Firmware Analysis at Scale: A Case Study on Embedded Web Interfaces" http://firmware.re/dynamicanalysis/
 - "A Large-Scale Analysis of the Security of Embedded Firmwares" http://firmware.re/usenixsec14/
- www.firmware.re
- www.s3.eurecom.fr/~costin/

Tools

- http://binwalk.org/
- http://www.binaryanalysis.org/
- http://rips-scanner.sourceforge.net/
- http://www.arachni-scanner.com/
- https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed
- http://w3af.org/
- http://www.metasploit.com/
- http://www.tenable.com/products/nessus-vulnerability-sectors

Tools

- https://shodan.io
- https://zmap.io
- https://scans.io
- https://censys.io

Acknowledgements

• Dr. Jonas Zaddach

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• Dr. Apostolis Zarras



Thank You! Questions?

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