Hacking and Securing Network Monitoring Systems:


End-to-end walkthrough example on Ganglia

Andrei Costin www.firmware.re @costinandrei

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#whoami

• Embedded security researcher, fresh Dr. :)




Agenda

- Introduction
- Overview of NMS
- Attack Lifecycle
- Pre-Attack
- Static Analysis
- Dynamic Analysis
- Vulnerability Analysis
- Exploit Development
- Conclusion


Introduction What is Cloud Computing?

"When broken down, cloud computing is a specialized distributed computing model. Building upon the desirable characteristics of **cluster, grid, utility**, and service-oriented computing, cloud computing introduces a unique complement of features to create a new computing paradigm"

J. Idziorek, Exploiting Cloud Utility Models for Profit and Ruin, 2012



Introduction What is HPC?




Introduction What is NMS?

- NMS
 - Network Monitoring System
 - Monitoring systems for infrastructure, servers and networks
- Where used?
 - HPC=High-Performance Computing
 - Grids
 - Clusters
 - Federation of Clusters
 - Cloud

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Introduction What is NMS?



Overview of NMS What are the tools? Sanglia Nagios Zenõss*





collectd OPEN SOURCE MONITORING TOOL http://www.tecmint.com





Overview of NMS What are the tools?

Ganglia


"a scalable distributed monitoring system for High-Performance Computing (HPC) systems such as clusters and grids"


Cacti

"a complete network graphing solution"

Observium

"an autodiscovering network monitoring platform supporting a wide range of hardware platforms and operating systems including Cisco, Windows, Linux, HP, Juniper, Dell, FreeBSD, Brocade, Netscaler, NetApp and many more. Observium seeks to provide a powerful yet simple and intuitive interface to the health and status of your network"





Overview of NMS How they work?

• Hands-On

- exercise_setup.txt
- Check Ganglia installation
- Check Ganglia info leak

Overview of NMS Who uses them?

WHO USES GANGLIA?


Berkeley (the birthplace of ganglia) Twitter flickr last.fm OpenX Monetate San Diego Supercomputing Center (contributed great code to the project) Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) National Institutes of Health (NIH) Reuters **Internet Archive** Industrial Light & Magic Wikipedia (check it out!) Virginia Tech (built the fastest supercomputer at any academic institution in the world using ganglia) Etsy Pandora **Dow Chemical**


Motorola Harvard D.E. Shaw Lucent CERN Cisco Sun (thanks for recommending ganglia for Grid Infrastructure!) HP Microsoft Dell (thanks for the hardware donation!) Cray Boeing Lockheed-Martin **GE Global Research** Cadence Design Systems nVidia Duke University Bank of America Queensland University of Technology **Georgetown University** UOL.com PriceGrabber.com **Ticket Master** Oinetia


Cummins freescale Sandia National Laboratories Rocketcalc Yale **Deutsches Elektronen-Synchrotron** bp Nortel LexisNexis Landmark SARA Bellsouth University of Pisa, Italy X-ISS Tennesee Tech University Princeton The Moving Picture Company University of Michigan Universite De Sherbrook The Royal Bank of Scotland U.S. Air Force Celgene Groundwork **Brookhaven National Laboratory** N.E.C. GlobeXplorer John Deere Xilinx Freddie Mac jeteye Tokyo Institute of Technology **Purdue University** Stanford and **thousands** of other people just ask Google.


Attack Lifecycle First step?


Attack Lifecycle First step?














- Information Leakage
 - IP Address, OS/SW/HW Details, Users, Commands
 - Active/Passive Scans, Use Info Leak
 - Phase: Initial Recon and Internal Recon




- Web-Application Security
 - XSS, SQLi, Remote Cmd/Code Execution (RCE)
 - Use Static/Dynamic Analysis, Use Vuln Analysis
 - Phase: Initial Compromise/Establish Foothold



- Classic Attacks
 - Buffer Overflows, Kernel Exploits
 - CVEs for Old Kernels, Use Info Leak
 - Phase: Escalate Privileges/Move Laterally



- Mimicry/Blended Attacks
 - ResourceUsage/Communication/Process Mimicry
 - Evade IDS and Anomaly Detection, Use Info Leak
 - Phase: Maintain Presence



Usernames

- Login Bruteforce
- Social Engineering Emails (e.g., phishing, drive-by)

• Social Engineering Toolkit (SET)

Welcome to the SET E-Mail attack method. This module allows you

to specially craft email messages and send them to a large (or small) number of people with attached fileformat malicious payloads. If you want to spoof your email address, be sure "Sendmail" is installed (it is installed in BT4) and change the config/set_config SENDMAIL=OFF flag to SENDMAIL=ON.

There are two options, one is getting your feet wet and letting SET do everything for you (option 1), the second is to create your own FileFormat payload and use it in your own attack. Either way, good luck and enjoy

- 1. Perform a Mass Email Attack
- 2. Create a FileFormat Payload
- 3. Create a Social-Engineering Template
- 4. Return to Main Menu

OS Details

- CVEs for Kernel
- NIST NVD, CVEdetails

Linux » Linux Kernel : All Versions

Sort Results By : Version Descending Version Ascending Number of Vulnerabilities Descending Num

Total number of versions found = 1772 Page : 1 (This Page) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1

Version	Language	Update	Edition	Number of Vulnerabilities	
2.6.0				489	Version Details Vulnerabilities
2.6.1				478	Version Details Vulnerabilities
2.6.2				465	Version Details Vulnerabilities
2.6.10				465	Version Details Vulnerabilities
2.6.11				457	Version Details Vulnerabilities

OS Details

- CVEs for Kernel
- Linux Kernel 2.6.32

Linux » Linux Kernel » 2.6.32 RC4 : Vulnerability Statistics


Vulnerabilities (182) Related Metasploit Modules (Cpe Name:cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.32:rc4)

Vulnerability Feeds & Widgets

Vulnerability Trends Over Time

Year	# of Vulnerabilities	DoS	Code Execution	Overflow	Memory Corruption	Sql Injection	xss	Directory Traversal	Http Response Splitting	Bypass something	Gain Information	Gain Privileges	CSRF	File Inclusion	# of exploits
<u>2009</u>	14	<u>11</u>		<u>3</u>	1						<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>			
<u>2010</u>	75	<u>37</u>		<u>9</u>	4					4	25	<u>Z</u>			<u>3</u>
<u>2011</u>	69	<u>50</u>		<u>16</u>	<u>6</u>					1	<u>20</u>	<u>8</u>			1
<u>2012</u>	4	<u>3</u>								1					
<u>2013</u>	12	Z		3	1					2	1	<u>2</u>			
<u>2014</u>	1	1													
<u>2015</u>	7	2			1					2	<u>1</u>	1			
Total	182	<u>111</u>		31	<u>13</u>					<u>10</u>	<u>48</u>	22			<u>4</u>
% Of All		61.0	0.0	17.0	7.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.5	26.4	12.1	0.0	0.0	

- Commands, Resource Usage
 - Mimicry and Blending Attacks
- How?
 - Learn normal system status/behaviour Xn
 - When in malicious state Xm, stick as close as possibly to the legitimate state Xn
 A(Xm) = argmin d(Xm, Xn), s.t., d(Xm, Xn) < D



Reconaissance Types

- Active
 - Tools: NMAP, AMAP, Nessus
 - Pros: +/- accurate, wide range of info
 - Cons: noisy, triggers IPS/IDS

- Passive
 - Search dorks: Google, Shodan
 - Attack: Information Leakage and non-Authorization

- Google dorks Ganglia
 - intitle:"Cluster Report"
 - intitle:"Grid Report"
 - intitle:"Node View"
 - intitle:"Host Report"
 - intitle:"Ganglia:: "
 - "Ganglia Web Frontend version 2.0.0"

- Google dorks Ganglia Romania
 - intitle:"Cluster Report"
 - intitle:"Grid Report"
 - intitle:"Node View"
 - intitle:"Host Report"
 - intitle:"Ganglia:: "
 - "Ganglia Web Frontend version 2.0.0"

- Google dorks Ganglia Romania
 - intitle:"Cluster Report" site:.ro
 - intitle:"Grid Report" site:.ro
 - intitle:"Node View" site:.ro
 - intitle: "Host Report" site:.ro
 - intitle:"Ganglia:: " site:.ro
 - "Ganglia Web Frontend version 2.0.0"

Google dorks – Ganglia – Romania

🔮 planckgrid.spacescience.ro/ganglia/?c=ISS-Planck&h=planckgrid.local&m=load_one&r=hour&s=by name&hc=4&mc=2

This host is up and running.

	Time and String Metrics
boottime	Thu, 09 Apr 2015 12:07:06 +0300
Gmond Started	Mon, 03 Aug 2015 17:17:54 +0300
IP Address	172.16.6.1
Last Reported	0 days, 0:00:14
Location	0,0,0
machine_type	x86_64
os_name	Linux
os_release	2.6.32-431.11.2.el6.x86_64
ps	
ps-0	pid=4610, cmd=VBoxHeadless, user=ionel, %cpu=3.28, %mem=2.62, size=28, data=21872, shared
ps-1	pid=28073, cmd=gmetad, user nobody, %cpu=3.28, %mem=0.00, size=68, data=1884, shared=11
ps-10	pid=6, cmd=watchdog/0, user=root, %cpu=0.00, %mem=0.00, size=0, data=0, shared=0, vm=0
ps-11	pid=7, cmd=migration/1, user=root, %cpu=0.00, %mem=0.00, size=0, data=0, shared=0, vm=0
ps-12	pid=8, cmd=migration/1, user=root, %cpu=0.00, %mem=0.00, size=0, data=0, shared=0, vm=0
ps-13	pid=9, cmd=ksoftirqd/1, user=root, %cpu=0.00, %mem=0.00, size=0, data=0, shared=0, vm=0
ps-14	pid=10, cmd=watchdog/1, user=root, %cpu=0.00, %mem=0.00, size=0, data=0, shared=0, vm=0
ps-15	pid=11, cmd=migration/2, user=root, %cpu=0.00, %mem=0.00, size=0, data=0, shared=0, vm=0
ps-16	pid=12, cmd=migration/2, user=root, %cpu=0.00, %mem=0.00, size=0, data=0, shared=0, vm=0
ps-17	pid=13, cmd=ksoftirqd/2, user=root, %cpu=0.00, %mem=0.00, size=0, data=0, shared=0, vm=0
ps-18	pid=14, cmd=watchdog/2, user=root, %cpu=0.00, %mem=0.00, size=0, data=0, shared=0, vm=0
ps-19	pid=15, cmd=migration/3, user=root, %cpu=0.00, %mem=0.00, size=0, data=0, shared=0, vm=0
ps-2	pid=3315, cmd=gmond, user=nobody, %cpu=2.63, %mem=0.02, size=152, data=11224, shared=3
ps-20	pid=16, cmd=migration/3, user=root, %cpu=0.00, %mem=0.00, size=0, data=0, shared=0, vm=0
ps-21	pid=17, cmd=ksoftirqd/3, user=root, %cpu=0.00, %mem=0.00, size=0, data=0, shared=0, vm=0
ps-22	pid=18, cmd=watchdog/3, user=root, %cpu=0.00, %mem=0.00, size=0, data=0, shared=0, vm=0
ps-23	pid=19, cmd=migration/4, user=root, %cpu=0.00, %mem=0.00, size=0, data=0, shared=0, vm=0
ps-3	pid=2662, cmd=kondemand/14, user=root, %cpu=0.66, %mem=0.00, size=0, data=0, shared=0, v
ps-4	pid=3307, cmd=snmpd, user=root, %cpu=0.66, %mem=0.01, size=28, data=3708, shared=976, vn

Time and String Metrice

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8 V Good

- Google dorks Cacti
 - inurl:"/cacti/graph_view.php"
 - intitle:"cacti" inurl:"graph_view.php"

• Google dorks – Cacti

umopt1.grid.umich.ed	lu/cacti/graph_view.php?action=tree&tree_id=1&lea	if_id=558 🗇 😵 🗹 v cve 2.6.32-504 🔍
graphs		
Graphs -> Tree Mode		
H-AGLT2_UM H-APC Cache_Info	Presets: Last 4 Hours V From: 2015-08-23 1 Search:	4:04 To: 2015-08-23 18:04 A 1 Day V refresh clear Graphs per Page: 30 V Thumbnails: 90 clear
- Default Tree		
	<< Previous	Showing Graphs 1 to 30 of 102 [1 ,2,3,4]
Tier2 Services	Tree: Default Tree-> Host: umfs13.aglt2.org	
Host:	Graph Template: Host MIB - Logged in Users	
 Host: linat06 Host: linat07 Host: linat07 Host: umfs02 Host: UMT3INT03.AGLT2.ORG Host: UMT3INT01.AGLT2.ORG Host: UMT3INT01.AGLT2.ORG Host: umdist05 Host: umfs11 Host: umfs13.aglt2.org Host: RAC_J88LMH1 Host: RAC_2FD6LH1 		umfsl3.aglt2.org - Logged in Users
Host: RAC_FK1FNH1	Graph Template: Host MIB - Processes	
Host: RAC_H88LMH1 Host: RAC_BZD7VC1 Host: umfs12 Host: c-6-30 Host: c-6-31 Host: c-4-37 Host: dc2-4-15 Host: dc2-4-17 Host: c-4-18 Host: c-4-18		umfsl3.aglt2.org - Processes
"Host: c-4-19 "Host: c-5-37 "Host: c-5-38		Running Processes Current: 447 Average: 450 Maximum: 460
Host: c-5-38		
Host: c-4-40	Graph Template: Host MIB - Storage	
Host: c-6-13		umfs13.aglt2.org - Storage on / 🔍

$\begin{array}{l} \textbf{Recon} a issance \\ \textbf{Passive and Recursive} \\ \textbf{Output} \textbf$


🗢 🛞 umopt1.grid. umich.ed u	u/cacti/graph_view.php?action=tree&tree_id=1&leaf	_id=558 🖓 🔻 😵 🚼 🔻 cve 2.6.32-504 🔍
graphs		
Graphs -> Tree Mode		
AGLT2_UM APC Cache_Info Cache_Info Default Tree Host: Localhost Tier2 Services	Presets: Last 4 Hours ▼ From: 2015-08-23 14 Search: << Previous Tree: Default Tree-> Host: umfs13.agit2.org	Image: Showing Graphs 1 to 30 of 102 [1,2,3,4]
Host:	Graph Template: Host MIB - Logged in Users	
Host: Host: linat06 Host: linat07 Host: linat07 Host: umfs02 Host: UMT3INT03.AGLT2.ORG Host: UMT3INT01.AGLT2.ORG Host: UMT3INT01.AGLT2.ORG Host: umfs11 Host: umfs13 Host: umfs13 Host: umfs13 Host: AC_J88LMH1 Host: RAC_J706LH1	3	umfs13.aglt2.org - ogged in Users
Host: RAC_FK1FNH1	Graph Template: Host MIB - Processes	
Host: RAC_H88LMH1 Host: RAC_BZD7VC1 		umfs13.aglt2.org - Processes
	Graph Template: Host MIB - Storage	
Host: c-6-13		umfs13.agit2.org - Storage on / 🔍

Reconaissance Passive and **Recursive**

- Google dorks Cacti \rightarrow Ganglia
 - www.aglt2.org




ATLAS Computing and Muon Calibration Center



Home	Computing	Calibration	Projects	General	Media	People	Wiki		Simulated black	k hole event in ATLAS More Images
AGLT2	Overview ATL/	S Information	Higgs Boson	Panel						
News								Cur	rent Statistics	
SuperComputing 2014: One Server, 100 Gbps over the WAN for ATLAS/LHC Software Driven Dynamic Hybrid Networks With Terabit/sec Science Data Flows More information						We have 3567 Condor jobs (2944 running on 6066 cores, 614 idle, 9 held) Total Slots 3163, Cores 6826				
	als and photos							<u>Job</u>	<u>o status page</u>	

Reconaissance Passive and **Recursive** • Google dorks – Cacti \rightarrow Ganglia

• www.aglt2.org




Reconaissance Passive and **Recursive**

• Google dorks – Cacti \rightarrow Ganglia

• From Cacti reached also to Ganglia!

🔶 💽	🛿 🛞 ganglia-um.aglt2.org/ganglia/?r=day&cs=&ce=&m=load_fifteen&s=by+name&c=MSU+T2&h=cc-102-1.msulocal&host_regex=&max_graphs=0 🎡 🔻 🍪 🤇											
	Cluster Ganglia Report											
Main	Search Views Aggregate Graphs C			Comp	pare Hosts	Events	Automatic Rotation	Mobile				
	0.0 4			• •		- 2015 00		400				
cc-102-1.msulocal Host Report for Tue, 25 Aug 2015 09:07:11 -0400												
Last	hour 2hr	4hr	day week	month	year	or from		to		Go Clea	r	
AGLT	AGLT2-ATLAS Grid > MSU T2 > cc-102-1.msulocal											
Hos	Host Overview											
	This host is up and running.											
								Time	and Stri	ing Metrics		
boott	boottime Fri, 15 May 2015 12:28:04 -0400											
Gmo	Gmond Started Tue, 21 Jul 2015 10:09:31 -0400											
IP Ac	P Address					1	10.10.129.254					
Last	Last Reported					0	0 days, 0:00:18					
Locat	tion					1	.02,1,0					
mach	ine_type					х	86_64					
os_na	ame					L	.inux					
os_re	lease					2	.6.32-504	.8.1.el6.x86_64				
ps												
ps-0						p	id=20588	12, cmd=slim_new	est, user	=glow, %cpu=:	100.36, %men	n=3.10, :
ps-1	pid=1350885, cmd=athena.py, user=usatlas1, %cpu=99.70, %mem=4.6 vm=2741960							n=4.64,				
ps-2	2 pid=1434726, cmd=athena.py, user=usatlas1, %cpu=99.70, %mem=4 vm=2739088						n=4.66,					

Reconaissance Passive



The Washington Post

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Explore the Internet of Things

Use Shodan to discover which of your devices are connected to the Internet, where they are located and who is using them.

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CNNMoney

Monitor Network Security

Keep track of all the computers on your network that are directly accessible from the Internet. Shodan lets you understand your digital footprint.



See the Big Picture

Websites are just one part of the Internet. There are power plants, Smart TVs, refrigerators and much more that can be found with Shodan!



BBC NEWS

Get a Competitive Advantage

Who is using your product? Where are they located? Use Shodan to perform empirical market intelligence.

WIRED CIO

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Reconaissance Passive

• Shodan – Ganglia – Romania

https://www.shodan.io/search?quer	y=port:"8649"-	+country:"RO"&language=en	វវិ
SHODAN port:"8649" country:"RO"		Q Explore Membership	Contact Us Blog Enterprise Access
Exploits 🔹 Maps 🕹 Download Resu	lts Lui Create	e Report	
TOP COUNTRIES	31	Showing results 1 - 9 of 31 82.76.58.35 82-76-58-35.rdsnetro Linux 2.6.x RCS & RDS Business Added on 2015-11-09 12:08:37 GMT Romania, Bucharest Details	HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden Server: Icecast 2.4.1 Date: Mon, 09 Nov 2015 12:08:35 GMT Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: Mon, 26 Jul 1997 05:00:00 GMT Pragma: no-cache
TOP CITIES	3		Icecast connection limit reached
Constanta Sibiu Cluj-napoca Alexandria TOP ORGANIZATIONS	2 1 1 1	86.122.20.112 RCS & RDS Residential Added on 2015-11-04 16:00:30 GMT Romania, Alexandria Details	220 RBFilms FTP server ready.
Ringier Print SRL RCS & RDS Business IX Telecom SRL IC Distinct New Media SRL Euroweb Romania SA TOP OPERATING SYSTEMS inux 2.6.x	8 6 3 2	91.216.152.45 Ringier Print SRL Added on 2015-11-04 07:13:04 GMT Romania Details	xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1" standalone="yes"? GANGLIA_XML [<br ELEMENT GANGLIA_XML (GRID CLUSTER HOST)* ATTLIST GANGLIA_XML VERSION CDATA #REQUIRED ATTLIST GANGLIA_XML SOURCE CDATA #REQUIRED ELEMENT GRID (CLUSTER GRID HOSTS METRICS)*
TOP PRODUCTS Sanglia XML Grid monitor OpenSSH	19 3	91.216.152.51 Ringier Print SRL Added on 2015-11-04 00:19:10 GMT Romania Details	xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1" standalone="yes"? GANGLIA_XML [<br ELEMENT GANGLIA_XML (GRID CLUSTER HOST)* ATTLIST GANGLIA_XML VERSION CDATA #REQUIRED ATTLIST GANGLIA_XML SOURCE CDATA #REQUIRED ELEMENT GRID (CLUSTER GRID HOSTS METRICS)*

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Reconaissance Passive

Hands-on

- exercise_recon_dorks.txt
- How to create a "search dork"
- intext:"Ganglia Web Backend (gmetad) version 3.6.0"
 - About 507,000 results (0.58 seconds) ~ Nodes

Hands-on

- exercise_recon_apis.txt
- Automate, using search APIs to collect data
- Parse data
- NOTE: at the end, if time permits

Results

- Exposed web interfaces
 - 364 Ganglia
 - ~43K nodes (web info leak)
 - ~1370 clusters
 - ~490 grids
 - 5K Cacti (~80% password protected)
 - 2K Observium (~80% password protected)
- Exposed daemons
 - ~40K publicly exposed Ganglia gmond nodes (XML Info Leak)

Reconaissance Results

TABLE I

DISTRIBUTION AND COUNTS OF UNIQUE HOSTS, SPLIT BY GANGLIA'S MODULE AND COUNTRY OF HOSTS' IP.

Country (iso2 code)	Ganglia Gmond	Ganglia Web Frontend
US	51%	32%
CN	10%	4%
KR	8%	8%
ES	6%	3%
FR	4%	3%
TW	3%	7%
DE	3%	3%
IT	$\approx 1\%$	3%
СН	$\ll 1\%$	5%
Others	14%	32%
Total (count)	39553	364

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Results

- 43K nodes on 364 Ganglia Web Interfaces
- 120 main kernel versions
 - 411 kernel sub-versions
- Kernel version 2.6.32
 - Runs on 38% of the 43K hosts
 - Summarizes 1600 vulnerabilities
- "Secured" kernels
 - grsecurity on 9 hosts (only!)
 - hardened-sources on 6 hosts (only!)

Reconaissance Results

amzn kernels on 45 hosts (~0.1%)

inurl:"/ganglia/?c=SamsungProduction"

Web Images Videos News Shopping More - Search tools

About 38 results (0.45 seconds)

Ganglia:: monitoring-master4.localdomain Host Report ec2-54-225-183-154.compute-1.amazonaws.com/ganglia?c=SamsungProd...

Feb 17, 2015 - Invoke automatic rotation system. Automatic rotation rotates all of the graphs/metrics specified in a view waiting 30 seconds in between each.

Ganglia:: mongodb3 Host Report

ec2-54-225-183-154.compute-1.amazonaws.com/ganglia?c=SamsungProd...

Feb 17, 2015 - Invoke automatic rotation system. Automatic rotation rotates all of the graphs/metrics specified in a view waiting 30 seconds in between each.

Ganglia:: ip-10-65-2-155.ec2.internal Host Report ec2-54-225-183-154.compute-1.amazonaws.com/ganglia?c=SamsungProd...


Feb 17, 2015 - Invoke automatic rotation system. Automatic rotation rotates all of the graphs/metrics specified in a view waiting 30 seconds in between each.

Ganglia:: ip-10-113-175-12.ec2.internal Host Report ec2-54-225-183-154.compute-1.amazonaws.com/ganglia?c=SamsungProd...

Feb 17, 2015 - Invoke automatic rotation system. Automatic rotation rotates all of the graphs/metrics specified in a view waiting 30 seconds in between each.

- Static analysis
 - "Static analysis is the process of testing an application by examining its source code, byte code or application binaries for conditions leading to a security vulnerability, without actually running it."
- Tools
 - We use RIPS for Ganglia Web Frontend (PHP)
 - More tools

- Dynamic analysis
 - "Dynamic analysis is the process of testing the application by running it."
- Tools
 - We use Arachni Scanner for Ganglia Web Frontend



- Analysis data
 - 25 Ganglia versions (static + dynamic)
 - 4 JobMonarch plugin versions (static only)
 - 35 Cacti versions (static only)
 - 1 Observium version (static only)





Fig. 1. Vulnerabilities in Ganglia Web Frontend found statically with RIPS. Distribution by Ganglia's version and vulnerability type.






Fig. 2. Vulnerabilities in Ganglia Web Frontend found dynamically with Arachni. Distribution by Ganglia's version and vulnerability type.

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- Perform static analysis
- exercise_static_analysis.txt
- Hands-on
 - Perform dynamic analysis
 - exercise_dynamic_analysis.txt
- Compare the two types of analysis

Ganglia 364

• 193 hosts (i.e., 53%) run Ganglia Web ver < 3.5.1

CVE-2012-3448

Name	CVE-2012-3448
Description	Unspecified vulnerability in Ganglia Web before 3.5.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via unknown attack vectors.
Source	CVE (at NVD; oss-sec, fulldisc, OSVDB, EDB, Metasploit, Red Hat, Ubuntu, Gentoo, SuSE, Mageia, more)
References	DSA-2610-1
NVD severity	high (attack range: remote)
Debian Bugs	683584
-	

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
Ganglia 364

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Compromise + Foothold Vulnerability Analysis • CVE-2012-3448



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Compromise + Foothold VulnAnalysis + ExploitDev

- Hands-on
 - exercise_vuln_analysis.txt

Compromise + Foothold VulnAnalysis + ExploitDev • ExploitDB 38030 CVE-2012-3448




Ganglia Web Frontend < 3.5.1 - PHP Code Execution

Next Exploit »

EDB-ID: 38030	CVE: 2012-3448	OSVDB-ID: 84240	
Verified: X	Author: Andrei Costin	Published: 2015-08-31	
Download Exploit: 🗟 Source 🗋 Raw	Download Vulnerable App: 🚣		

« Previous Exploit

<?php /* ********** ******************************* # Author : Andrei Costin (andrei theATsign firmware theDOTsign re) : CVE-2012-3448 PoC # Desc # Details : This PoC will create a dummy file in the /tmp folder and will copy /etc/passwd to /tmp. To modify the attack payload, modify the code below. \ # Setup : Ubuntu Linux 14.04 LTS x86 with Ganglia Web Frontend 3.5.0 1. Assuming that ganglia is installed on the target machine at this path: /var/www/html/ganglia/ 2. Assuming the attacker has minimal access to the target machine and can write to "/tmp". There are several methods where a remote attacker can also trigger daemons or other system processes to create files in "/tmp" whose content is (partially) controlled by the remote attacker.





Countermeasures

- Password protect
 - Hands-on
 - exercise_basic_auth.txt
- HTTPS
 - Hands-on Exercise
 - exercise_https.txt
- HTTPS Caveats
 - From 364 Ganglia Web Frontends
 - Only 42 (i.e., 11.5%) run HTTPS
 - Only 16 (i.e., 39%) run "trusted" HTTPS

Reference

• A. Costin, "All your cluster-grids are belong to us: Monitoring the (in)security of infrastructure monitoring systems", Proceedings of the 1st IEEE Workshop on Security and Privacy in the Cloud (SPC), Florence Italy, September 2015.








Fig. 2. Vulnerabilities found dynamically with Arachni. Distribution by Ganglia's version and vulnerability type.

The End Thank You! Questions?

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